

1. Behme, Christina

Is Cartesian Linguistics Cartesian or Chomskian?

Noam Chomsky (1966, 1967) argues that his view about language acquisition follows the Cartesian tradition. He holds that Descartes' commitment to innate ideas necessitates the postulation of an innate domain specific language acquisition device (LAD). Focusing on three fundamental claims of Chomsky that (i) language is species specific, (ii) language is domain specific, and (iii) language depends on innate knowledge I will inquire whether or not Descartes was committed to the view Chomsky attributes to him. I will provide textual evidence supporting my conclusion that while Descartes believed that language is species specific he was neither committed to the view that language is domain specific nor that language acquisition depends on innate knowledge.

Descartes' writings demonstrate that he believed that language is species specific: all humans have it regardless of a wide range of differences in their health, age, and intelligence. On the other hand, no animal has it. The fact that language is species specific could be explained in two different ways. In the first scenario only humans have a domain specific language faculty. It would be possible that an animal, that had implanted an artificial language faculty, would behave in ways that are indistinguishable from a human being. In the second scenario language is merely an indicator of general intelligence (thought and reason in Descartes' terminology). In this case it would not be possible to 'construct' a language faculty that is independent of 'general intelligence'. I will provide evidence for my claim that Descartes was committed to the second scenario.

When Descartes discusses the differences between animals and humans he stresses repeatedly that very little reason is needed to use language. This could indicate he believed like Chomsky that humans have a domain specific language faculty that is independent of 'general intelligence'. However, Descartes claims at no point, that *no* intelligence (reason) is required for language. In fact when we pay attention to context we see that the purpose of Descartes' examples is to show that the fundamental difference between humans and animals is the possession of a mind. Therefore, language is not the distinguishing feature but rather a reliable indicator for this feature. This view is confirmed by the text. In *Discourse on Method* Descartes discusses the abilities of animals and observes that (some) animals have the necessary organs to speak but nevertheless "they cannot speak as we do, that is they cannot show that they are thinking..." (CSM I, p. 140). Further, Descartes stresses in letters to More that "speech is the only certain *sign* of thought" (CSMK III, p. 366, emphasis added). This would indicate that language is the outward expression of thought (Miel, 1969). Language requires a rational mind and, according to Descartes, animals lack such a mind (Gunderson, 1964; Miel, 1969). It is well established that for Descartes minds are indivisible: "we cannot understand a mind except as being indivisible... we cannot conceive of half a mind" (CSM II, p.

9). Descartes held that humans acquire and use language because they have rational minds. While language is an essential characteristic of humans (species specific) it is only an indicator of a rational mind not its foundation.

Next, I will show that the textual evidence supports a surprising view about Descartes' commitments regarding language acquisition. He states that language "can be acquired without any process of reasoning... [based] on experience alone" (CSM, II, p. 403), that we learn language by connecting words with their meanings and remembering later upon encountering words which things they signify and vice versa (CSMK, III, p. 307) at a time when our thoughts are 'confused' and based of 'misconceptions'. Not surprisingly the language we acquire under such circumstances is not a perfect tool for the correct expression of our thoughts. But while we can acquire new ways of thinking Descartes does not suggest that our language needs to be changed. After establishing these points about language acquisition I will show that my reading of Descartes is compatible with his theory of ideas in general and innate ideas in particular. Discussing the frequently cited passages in *Comments on a Certain Broadsheet* (CSM I, p. 304) where Descartes asserts that all ideas are innate I will show that a careful reading of the context reveals that Descartes' main goal here was to refute a scholastic account of perception (e.g., Windelband, 1958; Adams, 1975; Nelson, 1997; Schmaltz, 1997). On this interpretation what is innate is not the content of sensory ideas but the faculty of sense perception (Adams, 1975; Schmaltz, 1997; Nelson, 1997). I will show how this interpretation allows for a coherent Cartesian account of language acquisition.

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2. Brown, Deborah & Calvin Normore

Descartes and Animal Souls

Descartes is often thought to have denied that animals have souls and in one sense of 'soul' he does. That sense, however was by no means the only one common in his time nor the only one he considers. We argue that Descartes' position is best understood against the background of Galen and of Alexander of Aphrodisias and as having important similarities with the Alexandrian view in that the unity of an animal body requires its own principle prior to the reception of a sensitive or, in the case of humans, rational soul. Descartes' stance on the unity of animal bodies has consequences for how we are to interpret his remarks about the unity of the human body, and its special relationship to the rational soul.

3. Brunner, John

Descartes on the Will Extending Beyond the Intellect

Descartes teaches that error is possible because of an imbalance between the will and the intellect, and that error is risked just in case the will takes advantage of this imbalance and extends beyond the intellect: “the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it within the same limits, I extend its use to matters which I do not understand [*illam ... ad illa quae non intelligo extendo*]” (AT VII 58/CSM II 40).¹ In this paper, I attempt to sort out what Descartes means in claiming that the will ‘extends beyond’ the intellect.

The plainest meaning would be the literal one: the will extends beyond the intellect insofar as it operates without the intellect. That is, error is risked if and only if the will judges of that of which the intellect lacks perception. Call this the *extra*-perceptual reading. Gassendi, in the *Fifth Set of Objections*, reads Descartes this way, *i.e.* as “extending the will beyond the bounds [*ultra fines*] of the intellect” (AT VII 315/CSM II 219). However, he thinks this fails as an explanation of error, since it’s inconsistent with Descartes’ two-faculty account of judgment; in particular, with his *no-volition-without-perception* principle: “in the case of something which we do not in any way perceive, there is no judgement we can make” (*Principles* I.34). No doubt Gassendi is right that these are inconsistent, but few readers of Descartes settle for his troublemaking extra-perceptual reading.

Instead, the reading that’s standard in the literature takes ‘extends beyond’ to mean that the intellect operates on non-clear-and-distinct perceptions.² That is, among a subject’s perceptions, a subset are clear and distinct; error is risked if and only if the will judges beyond that subset. Call this the *inter*-perceptual reading. One of Descartes’ best readers, Spinoza, interprets him this way: “I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, if by intellect they understand only clear and distinct ideas. But I deny that the will extends more widely than perceptions, *or* the faculty of conceiving” (*Ethics* II P49S/G II 133). On top of the fact that this reading chimes with the no-volition-without-perception principle, there’s explicit evidence in Descartes to recommend it: “if, whenever I have to make a judgement, I restrain my will so that it extends to what the

¹ The abbreviations used herein are as follows. AT — Descartes (1974-1989) *Œuvres de Descartes*, 11 vols., Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds. (Paris:Vrin). CSM — Descartes (1984-1991) *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, 3 vols., John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). *Ethics* — Spinoza, *The Ethics* (in Spinoza [1985] *A Spinoza Reader*, Edwin Curley, ed. and trans. [Princeton: Princeton University Press]). G — Spinoza (1925) *Spinoza Opera*, 4 vols., Carl Gebhardt, ed. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter). *Principles* — Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy* (in AT VIIIA [Latin], AT IXB [French], CSM I).

² See, for example, Michael Della Rocca (2006) “Judgment and Will” (in Stephen Gaukroger, ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations*) [Malden, MA: Blackwell], pp. 142-159), p. 146, Stephen Menn (1998) *Descartes and Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 316, Margaret Wilson (1978) *Descartes* (London: Routledge), p. 140.

intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, and no further, then it is quite impossible for me to go wrong” (AT VII 62/CSM II 43; cf. *Principles* I.35). Thus, Gassendi’s extra-perceptual reading seems to indicate a profound lack of charity on his part. But is it *that* unreasonable? After all, Descartes often suggests a literal reading, e.g. “Precisely because of their eagerness to find the truth, people who do not know the right method of finding it often pass judgement on things of which they lack perception, and this is why they fall into error” (*Principles* I.42; cf. the first quoted passage above). What’s more, in answering Gassendi’s charge that his accounts of error and judgment conflict, Descartes does not brusquely dismiss the objection — as he so often does — but treats it as honest and germane. Nor does he reply with the standard, inter-perceptual reading. Rather, he explains the will’s surpassing the intellect in a more literal way: “So, while I do admit that when we direct our will towards something, we always have some understanding of some aspect of it, I deny that our understanding and our will are of equal scope. In the case of any given object, there may be many things about it that we desire but very few things of which we have knowledge” (AT VII 376-377/CSM II 259).

In this paper, I take Descartes’ claims that the will judges of things it lacks perception of at face value — unlike the inter-perceptual reading. But I interpret ‘extends beyond’ such that it does not contravene the no-volition-without-perception principle — unlike the extra-perceptual reading. To do so, I build on the preceding quote’s suggestion that objects of judgment may include unknown aspects, which nevertheless get caught up in judgments when one takes a volitional stance on the objects to which they belong. In short, then, I argue that ‘extends beyond’ means that the will operates on some aspect of an intellectual object that is not perceived. And so, while I think the standard, inter-perceptual reading is prescription enough for avoiding the ills of epistemic error, it’s not the fundamental explanation of what happens when error is risked.

THE INFINITE AND THE INDETERMINATE IN SPINOZA

This paper examines Spinoza's use of the word "infinite" and its cognates in the context of seventeenth century (and earlier) accounts of the infinite, and within Spinoza's work as a whole.

The infinite is central in Spinoza's thought. It plays important roles in the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*, the *Short Treatise*, the *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy*, the *Political Treatise*, Spinoza's correspondence and, of course, the *Ethics*. In the *Ethics*, it first occurs at E1D6: "Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit."

While E1D6 describes both God and his attributes as infinite, for the past twenty years or so, what little discussion there is of the infinite in Spinoza has usually centred around the infinitude of the attributes, and not of God or substance simpliciter. While George Kline (1977) marks the beginning of this trend, it is Jonathan Bennett's argument that Spinoza uses "'infinite' as a virtual synonym for 'all'" (Bennett 76) that drives most of the discussion in the literature. Following George Kline, but modernizing Spinoza in his usual way, Bennett reads "infinite" as Spinoza's universal quantifier and thereby infers that there needn't be more than two attributes (extension and thought) in Spinoza's ontology. Alan Donagan agrees with Bennett that "how many attributes God has will... depend upon how many there are. There is no implication that their number must be enormous" (Donagan 83). Edwin Curley, on the other hand, rejects the view that "infinite attributes" is consistent with a finite number (i.e., two) of attributes, blaming the popularity of Bennett's approach on contemporary philosophers' "aversion to the view that God has infinitely many unknown attributes" (Curley 143n.13). Curley himself is so committed to the importance of retaining the contrast between "infinite" and "finite" that, in his version of the *Ethics*, he translates "infinitis attributis" as "an infinite number of attributes," interpolating the "number of" without even a footnote to indicate that his translation is also (more than is inevitably the case with any text) an *interpretation* -- an interpretation that crucially overlooks E1D6's characterization of God as "ens absolute infinitum."

Curley's translation of E1D6 is extremely telling in that it explicitly makes infinity a mathematical concept for Spinoza, as it was for Leibniz and most of those who followed him. It is in a mathematical sense that Bennett's claim that there need only be two attributes in Spinoza's ontology fails, on Curley's view, to retain the usual contrast between the infinite and the finite. However, I argue that Spinoza's conception of the infinite was not a mathematical one. Indeed, if Spinoza never tells us how many attributes there are (and, in his mature work, he never does), this is precisely because anything truly infinite eludes counting for Spinoza -- not because it is so large as to be uncountable, but because it is just not the kind of thing that can be enumerated or measured. I argue that, for

Spinoza, the infinite is the utterly indeterminate -- a conception that has affinities with Jewish negative theology.

I muster evidence for this argument by examining Spinoza's use of the term "infinite" and its cognates throughout his corpus, but paying special attention to (1) the way in which Spinoza juxtaposes indeterminacy with finitude in his E1P15 discussion of God's extendedness and of the indivisibility of extended substance and (2) Spinoza's much-quoted Ep. L dictum "determinatio negatio est." While we nowadays conceive of the infinite mathematically, I argue that Spinoza's conception was closer to a grammatical one -- a conception whose traces are still evident in the infinitive tense of verbs. I offer supplementary evidence for this conclusion from Joseph Ratner and Harry Wolfson's nearly century old debate about the infinite in Spinoza and from Pierre-Sylvain Régis's definitions of "infinite".

I conclude by sketching some implications of all of this for Spinoza's metaphysics.

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5. Debes, Remy

The Value of Persons in the Moral Philosophy of Adam Smith

Where exactly should we place Adam Smith in the canon of classical liberalism? Smith's advocacy of free market economics and defense of religious liberty in *The Wealth of Nations* suffice for including him somewhere in that tradition.³ The nature and extent of Smith's liberalism, however, remain up for debate. One recent trend has been to characterize Smith as a proponent of social liberalism. This includes those like Stephen Darwall, Samuel Fleischacker, and Charles Griswold, who have drawn attention to a kind of descriptive moral egalitarianism in Smith.⁴ Humans, Smith seems to hold, are naturally disposed to valuing one other under a conception of equality. But that is not all these scholars suggest. They have also hinted at something more contentious – the idea that, according to Smith, we value one another in a way resonant with contemporary notions of human *dignity*, conceived as the inherent value of persons grounding certain rights to, or restrictions on, treatment by others.⁵ In saying so, these scholars have hit upon something remarkable. However, I also think their arguments in this respect are both indirect and incomplete. Consequently, the full import of Smith's view remains obscure. This essay aims to bring some clarity.

For Smith, the term “dignity” never refers directly to the inherent value of persons as it often does in contemporary moral theory. Smith uses that term to express either the notion of social rank or the virtue of self-command.⁶ Nevertheless, in this paper I continue using the connotation of inherent value. This may seem anachronistic, but it is only a tool of exposition. The task is to say whether anything in Smith matches up to the contemporary concept of dignity, not to read any particular substantive account of dignity back into Smith. In fact, I ultimately argue that to interpret Smith we need an account of dignity that diverges radically from current theory.

Contemporary discussions of human dignity are dominated by a focus on either historically later Kantian notions of rational agency, or historically earlier

³ I intend this historically. I grant there are reasons to be skeptical about the ultimate fate of liberty in capitalist society (e.g. Marxist reasons). Also, the designation “free market” should be understood loosely, as most scholars now agree it is a mistake to identify Smith with thoroughgoing laissez-faire economics.

⁴ See Darwall, “Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (1999) 28 (2): 139-164). See also Fleischacker, *A Third Concept of Liberty Judgment and Freedom in Aristotle, Adam Smith, and Kant* (1999) and *On Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations* (2004); & Griswold, *Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Raphael, *The Impartial Spectator* (2007); and Brown, *Adam Smith's Discourse* (1994). Other major commentators holding some version of this view might include D.D. Raphael and Vivienne Brown.

⁵ See e.g. Fleischacker 2004 (p 205); Darwall (p. 142, 156) and Griswold (p. 235-239). One must be careful with Fleischacker, who also uses the adjectival “dignified” to express Smith's concern with what is “honorable” or “respectable” about persons in a way that doesn't obviously match up with the notion of inherent value (see e.g. p. 207). Darwall's argument includes by far the most explicit discussion of “dignity” as I've defined it; but as Darwall's article is ostensibly a book review (albeit a substantive one that addresses three books at once, including Griswold's), it can't be called a direct inquiry. Griswold never explicitly puts his interpretation in terms of “dignity,” but that is clearly what he is after. Thus Darwall also reads Griswold that way.

⁶ E.g. TMS I.i.5.1. NB: “Dignity” had of course been used to indicate inherent human worth well before Smith. But it was not a widespread connotation until well after Smith.

theistic conceptions of human nature, and, in particular, *imago Dei* (broadly construed). By contrast, I defend a conception of human worth based on Smith's distinctive sentimentalist moral theory as presented in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. To be clear, the aim is not to debunk alternative readings of Smith's conception of dignity. It is a happy consequence if Smith makes room for multiple reasons to value human dignity. That said, what partly distinguishes my interpretive thesis from alternative accounts is the suggestion that in Smith's moral theory the worth of persons is had most fundamentally in virtue of what is distinctively *affective* in human nature – not what is rational or divine. Here briefly is a description of my central argumentative strategy:

The Theory of Moral Sentiments (hereafter TMS) does not attempt to offer a fundamental principle of the good or the right or the just that would generate a reason, categorical or otherwise, to value persons. And yet it is precisely some kind of justificatory reason that a defensible account of human dignity requires. Thus, if any such reason can be attributed to Smith, it must be derived by indirect means. One such indirect route, and the approach of my argument, is a metaethical focus on the nature of human worth itself. I attempt to reconstruct a conception of persons *qua* moral agents⁷, which, in the context of Smith's broader moral theory, can be said to *be* valuable. The argument turns on the claim that, according to Smith, moral agency is fundamentally structured by a person's affective perspective or viewpoint on the world. In particular, moral agency requires a certain kind of spectorial judgment – either of others or reflective judgment of oneself. Intrinsic to such judgment exists a peculiar commitment to the authority other persons have over us, namely a recognition of *their* affective authority. In other words, realizing our own agency requires us to recognize the authority of the affective viewpoints of others – which is just to say we must respect others in virtue of a certain value we attribute to *their* agency. Thus does Smith offer us a reason to respect persons that is consistent with the notion of dignity.⁸ Constitutive to being a moral agent is the basis of a distinctive requirement to respect other persons as agents themselves.

⁷ The question is thus not to be confused with the classic problem of personal identity typically associated with some of Smith's contemporaries, like Hume or Locke.

⁸ I largely agree with those like D.D. Raphael who suggest that the TMS *purports* to offer only a narrow contribution of ethical theory. Nevertheless, by offering a reconstruction I'm suggesting that some of Smith's ideas, in particular about the nature of agency, had broader implications than even he might have realized.

6. Dempsey, Liam

An Early “qualia-based” Argument for Dualism

This paper considers a seventeenth century argument for (substance) dualism—propounded by Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth—which appeals to the nature of secondary qualities or sensations. It is argued that, despite the widespread acceptance of the primary/secondary quality distinction, this argument is relatively unique for its time since seventeenth century arguments for dualism generally appeal, not to sensory qualities, but to thought, rationality, or volition. Indeed, for many, sensations are the most *embodied* of mental phenomena. Although such an argument might, on the face of it, be called a “Lockean” argument for substance dualism, given Locke’s influential popularization of the primary-secondary quality distinction, it is shown that it is not, in fact, an argument to which Locke subscribes. Finally, points of comparison and contrast are drawn between this argument and nineteenth and twentieth century qualia-based arguments for (property) dualism and panpsychism.

I. Introduction

- Contemporary dualists typically defend a property dualism and appeal to the mysterious relation between qualia (the qualities of sensations) and neurophysiological activity.
- Traditionally, sensations are viewed as the most embodied of mental phenomena, and thus, the least indicative of the substantial duality of mind and body. As Descartes tells us in the *Sixth Meditation*, the “sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing but confused modes of thinking that arise from the *union*” of mind and body. Sensations, for Descartes, depend on the material body (Cottingham, 1985; Farkas, 2005; Vinci, 2008). Interestingly, then, seventeenth century arguments for dualism differ from modern arguments not only in the brand of dualism they seek to prove—the *substantial* duality of mind and body—but also in the mental phenomena to which they appeal.
- In this regard, Cudworth’s appeal to sensations in his defense of substance dualism is something of an exception.

II. Cudworth’s “qualia-based” argument for dualism

- Utilizing the primary-secondary quality distinction, Cudworth argues that since secondary qualities, like colours, are mind-dependent, the soul must be immaterial.

- Since all qualities require a subject, and secondary qualities are not qualities of matter, they must be qualities of an immaterial substance.
- Otherwise, we are left with what Cudworth takes to be an implausible and radical panpsychism, according to which “every *Smallest Atom*” is “a Percipient in it self” and “every one Man” is “but a *Heap* or a *Commonwealth* of innumerable Percipients.”

III. Lockean Dualism?

- Locke does not agree with Cudworth that secondary qualities imply an immaterial soul. In fact, Locke maintains that while consciousness is not, itself, material, it *is* necessarily embodied. Accordingly he is attracted, not to a substance dualism, but to a sort of property dualism.
- **Theological Motivations**
 - The divine punishment for Adam and Eve’s “original sin” is *mortality*, for them and their posterity. Humans are, by their very nature, mortal, dying with their bodies.
 - Personal immortality can only be achieved via *bodily* resurrection.
 - In short, persons are mortal and necessarily embodied.
- **Metaphysical & Epistemological Motivations**
 - Persons are neither material bodies nor immaterial souls but *conscious* things.
 - While God may have superadded consciousness to an immaterial subject, for all we know, he superadded consciousness to the material brain—Locke’s notorious suggestion of *thinking matter*
 - This has no ethical or religious consequences, however, since having an immaterial soul is, on Locke’s view, *neither* necessary *nor* sufficient for personal immortality.
 - Furthermore, *experience* suggests that, even if we have an immaterial soul, it *can* cease to be conscious, and *will* cease to be conscious upon bodily death. Hence, even granting the existence of immaterial soul which is incorruptible, we should expect that body and soul “both lie dead and inactive, the one without thought, the other without motion, a minute, an hour, or to eternity, which wholly depends upon the will” of God.

IV. The Role of Qualia

- While Cudworth argues for a substance, rather than a property, dualism, and although he does not appeal to an “explanatory gap,” *per se*, his argument is embedded in a conception of sensations as subjective and experiential (in this regard, we consider Locke’s inverted spectrum thought experiment).
- Although Cudworth takes panpsychism to be an untenable position, nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers (e.g., Seager 1999; Chalmers 1996, 2002) have felt the intuitive pull of panpsychism, appealing to what William James (1890) refers to as “*mind-dust*” to reconcile materialism—and evolution—and consciousness.

7. Duncan, John

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ABSTRACT

Reconstructing Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*

It is generally accepted that the basic position of Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men* is that humans are naturally independent, self-sufficient, non-aggressive and happy, and that propertied social and political formations generate dependency, inequality and misery. Although I agree this is the general position of the text, I argue the text draws explicitly on at least five discourses exclusive to the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and a careful reconstruction of the text has the effect of recasting the rationale for its general position. The *Discourse on Inequality* works explicitly with the tools of (1) the natural history of Buffon, (2) a travelogue literature detailing ongoing encounters with new "savage" worlds, (3) debates between Newtonians and Leibnizians on generality and particularity in the cosmos, (4) a substantialist, if stagist, philosophy of history, and (5) the literature of veiled political critique.

With respect to natural history Rousseau turns to his contemporary Buffon, one of the first natural historians to appreciate the significance of the newest temporal conceptions in geology, which at the time were suggesting that the traditional estimates for the age of the world were absurdly underestimated. Buffon argued that during the newly conceived great temporal expanse of natural history, environments could cause significant changes in organisms. Rousseau made Buffon's theory of change the backbone of the *Discourse*.

To put flesh on the Buffonian backbone, Rousseau used information drawn from travelogue reports of newly explored regions of the world. In his account, three distinct stages of largely natural existence precede the degeneration into propertied social and political existence. However, for Rousseau the problems internal to the three natural stages were not the causes of generalized degeneration leading to social misery. The source of degeneration had to be sought elsewhere.

Using basic principles developed by early modern cosmologists, Buffon and others reasoned hypothetically about the earth's formation and its history. Rousseau not only utilized what he took to be the hypothetical method of early modern cosmology, but he also utilized an interesting feature of the content of that discourse. During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries there were important philosophical and scientific discussions in which god's helping hand in the cosmos was either theoretically withdrawn (by followers of Leibniz) or added (by followers of Newton). It is as if Rousseau modeled his hypothetical experiment along the lines of a Newtonian *experimentum crucis*. He established the initial conditions of the experiment and then set the various components in motion. For this to work, miracles and the hand of providence had to be

excluded. Rousseau set up his experiment so that the initial condition of natural man excluded the seeds of generalized degeneration. The latter were to come to natural man from external sources, and when they did come, god's beneficent hand would not be there to correct for them. What we have is a philosophical anthropology that grounds itself in a substantialist view of human nature. The causes of human degeneration and its correctives are not essential to the human substance; they are accidental to it. This reflects the fundamental philosophy of history of the age. Although Rousseau's stagist account of the degeneration of mankind in the *Discourse* might seem to be an early example of the historicism that would explode in the nineteenth century, it is not. This is why Rousseau appears to fail to explain some of the transitions between some of the stages in the discourse.

Finally, Rousseau's discussions of the miseries of the propertied social and political variety of mankind still make for compelling moral and political critique, and one cannot help believing that they were aimed originally at European realities of the mid eighteenth century. Quite a few writers seem to have been concerned with the decadence and decline of European civilization in the period. Bossuet, Montesquieu, Herder and Gibbon all wrote about the decline of *Rome* in ways which suggested that contemporary *Europeans* should concern themselves with their own decline. Rousseau's criticisms are supposed to be merely fictional: "Since my subject concerns man in general, I will attempt to speak in terms that suit all nations, or rather, forgetting times and places in order to think only of the men to whom I am speaking, I will imagine I am in the Lyceum in Athens, reciting the lessons of my masters, having men like Plato and Xenocrates for my judges, and the human race for my audience." It is not unlikely that this very elaborate fictional frame for the entire discourse was a veil—deployed in the manner of his contemporaries—to hide from certain officials the real criticisms he developed so well throughout the text.

This is the result of Rousseau's imaginary discourse to Man in the Lyceum: the standard of natural independence is drawn from the hypothetical epoch most like the recently encountered native others, from which humanity falls, at first by chance, through a Buffonian degeneration in a godless, Newtonian world. Because of the current state of economic and political relations in Europe, the natural independence of the individual is lost. The standard of independence is to be established anew in the *Social Contract* according to "principles of political right," which themselves are sketched in the Letter to Geneva with which Rousseau prefaced the *Discourse*.

8. Jeff Edwards (Stony Brook)

“KICK NOT AGAINST THE PRICKS”: Cumberland, Pufendorf, and Hobbes on Natural Obligation

THE ARGUMENT

Three of the most influential theories of obligation in modern philosophy are found in treatises of Richard Cumberland, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Thomas Hobbes. It is with reference to these thinkers' accounts of natural obligation that we can better grasp how modern natural-law theory is related to the development of Scottish sentimentalist ethics, to the emergence of modern utilitarianism, and to various strains of deontological ethics that would lead to the Kantian understanding of morality as the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will. This paper examines some key sources of these different lines of development by focusing on Cumberland's and Pufendorf's criticisms of Hobbes.

In his *De legibus naturae* (1672), Cumberland responds to the arguments by which Hobbes sought to establish that a law of nature is binding only *in foro interno*, except when it can be kept without prejudice to the self-preservation of the internally obligated agent. Cumberland interprets these arguments as implying that laws of nature, understood as universally valid dictates of right reason, assert *no* obligation to external actions in the state of nature. In order to counter this purported implication, Cumberland approaches the question of the natural obligation to external action by considering the standpoint of the divine lawgiver who establishes the causal connection between the achievement of happiness as one's own natural good and the promotion of the good of the whole system of rational beings—the *bonum rationalium commune*. Accordingly, he seeks to ground the moral necessity of acting in obedience to the laws of nature by demonstrating the divinely established link between the happiness of the particular human agent and the happiness of rational beings in general. In *De jure naturae et gentium* (also 1672), Pufendorf takes up the question of obligation from an opposing point of view. In making God's lawgiving will the original source of moral obligation, Pufendorf holds that the type of connection which Cumberland wants to establish between the natural good of each human agent and the common good of rational beings is not directly relevant to the theory of the basis of natural obligation—that is, to the account of the originally binding character and prescriptive force of the fundamental law of nature that issues from the will of God. Although Pufendorf's fundamental law of nature enjoins the 'cultivation and preservation' of peaceful sociability (*socialitas*) as the condition of human well-being, our obligation to promote this sociability can only be understood in terms of the 'form of lawfulness' in accordance with which human actions are subordinated to God's will. The creative will of God, as expressed through God's legislation, is the only causal factor relevant to Pufendorf's account of the ground of natural obligation; and there is no metaphysically necessary connection between God's legislation and the conditions of human well-being or happiness. Happily, it has pleased God to order creation in such a

way that actions in keeping with the precepts of natural law have good consequences for us. But these precepts would bind us to the furtherance of human sociability even if none of us derived any advantage from acting in accordance with the *socialitas* requirement of practical reason that the fundamental law of nature contains.

Pufendorf's formalistic voluntarism offers a clear alternative to the doctrine of natural obligation that Cumberland puts forward in response to Hobbes' arguments pertaining to the internally prescriptive force of natural law and the obligation to external action. Yet we also find that Pufendorf is confronted with a crucial problem to which the proto-utilitarian and egoistic features of Cumberland's doctrine may seem to provide a ready response. The problem is this: How does one distinguish between obligation and simple compulsion if the ultimate source of obligation is nothing apart from the lawgiving will of a superior and supremely powerful being? The key difficulties that Pufendorf must successfully address when answering this question are presented by the argument on the nature of obligation that Hobbes constructs in the fifteenth chapter of *De cive* ("*De Regno Dei per naturam*"). Pufendorf attempts to refute this argument, thereby dismantling Hobbes' voluntarist doctrine of natural obligation even while circumventing the type of doctrine advocated by Cumberland.

Although Pufendorf's refutation of Hobbes' argument is unsuccessful, its historical import is highly significant. It sheds light on the sentimentalist theory of obligation that Francis Hutcheson would develop in explicit opposition to both Pufendorf and Cumberland. Moreover, given Hutcheson's influence on the early development of Kant's ethics, it illuminates various historical and conceptual pathways leading to the understanding of moral obligation as the dependence of the finite will on the principle of autonomy.

Relevant Literature for Seminar Discussion

Cumberland: *De legibus naturae disquisitio philosophica*, cap. V §§ 1-3, 9-10, 19-23, 27, 35, 45-47, 50. (Jon Parker's wonderful new edition of the English translation by Maxwell [*A Treatise of the Laws of Nature*] is available on the web. The PDF file can be downloaded. Go to:

http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/LFBooks/Cumberland0640/Treatise/PDFs/0996_Pt10_Chap5.pdf)

Pufendorf: *De jure naturae et gentium*, I.VI §§ 5, 10, 12; II.III §§ 15, 21. IN: Pufendorf, S. *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4.1, ed. G. Hartung, Berlin: Akademie Verlag. (The Kennett translation is available in PDF files. Go to:

http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/LFBooks/Pufendorf0210/LawOfNations/0163_Pt01_BookI.pdf

http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/LFBooks/Pufendorf0210/LawOfNations/0163_Pt02_BookII.pdf)

Hobbes: *De cive*, cap. XV §§ 1-7. (The Tuck/Silverthorne translation [Cambridge] replaces the 1651 English version.)

9. Forschler, Scott

Willing Universal Law vs. Universally Lawful Willing: Where Kant's Derivation of FUL Goes Wrong

Many attempts to derive moral principles from a universalizability test, most notably that of Immanuel Kant in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, consider whether an agent could will or endorse *all* other agents acting on certain principles. But this standard is inadequate because it gives counter-intuitive results in cases where other agents are *not* following principles which are so universalizable (i.e., it cannot easily explain how we may or should respond to evil-doers).

I will argue that the problem is even more basic. I will first defend a reconstruction of Kant's argument for the first (universal law) formula of the Categorical Imperative from his assumption of the supreme goodness of a good will, and show that it is best read as claiming that the supreme principle of morality must be a general principle which logically implies the acceptability of some particular maxims. However Kant's FUL does not have that logical character; it is not a sufficiently strong condition to justify the adoption of specific maxims via any process of deduction. I then show that an alternative principle does possess such logical strength. Kant may have failed to distinguish between the two principles because they can be described in almost identical words; the difference is grammatically subtle but profound in substance. Some formal symbolization can make their difference (concerning the scope of a modal operator indicating that a certain proposition is willed by an agent) more perspicuous.

While Kant's original principle (embodied in the formula of universal law) can be described as a requirement that our principles or maxims must be willable *as universal laws*, my alternative test requires that a moral agent must have a will *which acts lawfully* or *conforms to universal law as it wills* a specific maxim. That is, rather than requiring that we will that a certain maxim be followed by all agents, we must be able to will, for each possible agent, that this agent follow the maxim—regardless of whether other agents are following the maxim or not. This is actually a stronger condition than the FUL. It entails the FUL (the reverse is not true), but more importantly it directly entails the general acceptability of maxims which meet the criteria it specifies.

A further advantage of the revised principle is that it disallows the adoption of maxims which are rational to will in ideal or "full compliance" worlds, where everyone is following the same maxim, but which are not rational to will in non-ideal worlds or conditions, where some agents are not following the maxim. In other words, the newer principle forces us to adopt more flexible maxims, which permit or oblige us to respond more effectively to evildoers. This would have given Kant a better response to puzzles about war, murderers at the door, and other moral dilemmas, his solutions to which have been strongly criticized over the years. I speculate that Kant might also have mistakenly adopted his FUL

formula through an anticipation of his vision of an idealized moral world expressed in his “kingdom of ends” formulation, but argue that this should have no proper place in his argument for a perfectly general moral principle.

10. Gombay, André

Perspectives

It is a gorgeous day and I watch the sun run smoothly across the sky, as it goes to set behind the mountains on the western horizon. I know, of course, that the sun is immobile, that it is I – the earth on which I stand – that is moving, spinning in the opposite direction. But that knowledge does not destroy the other vision: these are simply two standpoints – two perspectives – from which I can view the day as it unwinds.

My paper will examine the role that the notion of *perspective* plays in the doctrines of 17th and 18th century philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza and Kant.

11. Gorham, Geoff

The Metaphysics of Newton's *De Gravitatione*: A Cartesian Interpretation

Since its first publication in 1962, scholarly interest in Newton's *De Gravitatione* has grown at an exponential rate. Ostensibly a treatise on hydrostatics, *De Grav* also contains a lengthy critique of Descartes' relationist conceptions of place and motion. Marshalling a powerful barrage of physical and metaphysical arguments, Newton concludes that "it is necessary that the definition of places, and hence of local motion, be referred to some motionless being, that is, extension alone as understood to be truly distinct from bodies". He then presents a detailed account of the nature of this absolute space (and time) and its relations to God, finite minds, and bodies. So the treatise promises insight on the treatment of these problems in the later *Principia*, *Optics*, and Clarke-Leibniz correspondence. However, the metaphysics of *De Grav* is dauntingly complex and technical, relying on difficult notions like 'emanent cause', 'eminent containment', 'mind-body union', 'affection of being qua being', 'creation vs. causation', and so on. For assistance, scholars have explored a variety of sources for this metaphysics: Henry More and the Cambridge Platonists, Charleton/Gassendi, Scholasticism, etc. (Koyré, Hall, McGuire, Carriero). At the same time, a number of commentators (especially Stein and DiSalle) have developed an influential 'minimalist' reading which re-conceives Newton's metaphysical apparatus in purely physical or empirical terms. Very recently, Janiak has attempted to recover, in the wake of minimalism, a role for Newtonian metaphysics *per se*. While this literature has illuminated considerably the philosophical underpinnings of Newton's physical ontology, I believe it has taken insufficient account of the distinctly Cartesian elements in *De Grav*. In particular, bringing Cartesian notions to bear on Newtonian metaphysics helps to clarify two issues that have remained somewhat obscure even though they are both dealt with at length in *De Grav*: the relation between God and space (and time), and mind-body interaction. I summarize below my Cartesian gloss of these two issues. I hope to show that close consideration of these Cartesian traces in *De Grav* will enrich ongoing discussion both of 'Newton as Philosopher' and of 'Descartes' Metaphysical Physics'.

1. Space and God. Although considerable attention has been directed to Newton's repeated assertion in *De Grav* that space is an "emanative effect" of God, disagreement remains about precisely what this relation involves. Emphasizing the Neo-Platonic connotation of 'emanative', many commentators have looked to Henry More and earlier Platonists for models of spatial emanation. It is far from clear, however, whether such models capture the highly intimate relation that Newton posits between absolute space and God's immensity. In the most detailed pronouncement on the issue, Newton says that space is an "affection of being qua being" and then equates affection with 'attribute' (*affectiones sive attributa*). Keeping in mind that Newton is composing *De Grav* with his dog-eared edition of Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy* at his

elbow, I argue that we should conceive of the relation between God and absolute space in the way Descartes articulates the relation between substances and the 'most general' (as opposed to principal or defining) attributes: duration, order, number, etc. (*Principles* I, 48). It turns out that Newtonian space and time are analogous to Cartesian attributes in no fewer than four important ways: (i) Common to all things; (ii) Absolutely unchanging; (iii) Neither substance nor mode; (iv) Merely conceptually distinct from substance.

2. Mind-Body Interaction. After explaining how space can be understood as "truly distinct from bodies" Newton turns to his own "hypothetical" explanation of "the nature of body". On this theory, bodies are simply "determinate quantities of extension" that God endows with three qualities: (i) mobility within absolute space; (ii) mutual impenetrability; and (iii) the power to produce sensations in minds and to be moved by them. Newton declares that his theory captures the "chief truths of metaphysics", including how bodies are "distinct from created minds but able to be united with minds". On this point, he both criticizes Descartes and defends his own model of interaction. What is remarkable – but has not been treated thoroughly in recent discussions of Newton on mind and body (e.g. Iliffe, Dempsey) – is that both the critique of Descartes and the defense of his own view rely crucially on the notorious Cartesian notion of *eminent containment*. Examining how Newton conceives and applies this notion will improve our understanding of the model of mental causation he so often employs. Newton's analysis also bears on a current debate about Descartes' own conception of eminent containment. Several recent commentators hold that for Descartes eminent containers of p do not possess p itself, but rather some distinct perfection q, typically a power or degree of excellence that is at least modally distinct from p. Such conceptions of eminent containment I label 'reductionist'. Opposing 'realist' views hold that eminently contained perfections are really possessed by the container and that the distinction between eminent and run-of-the-mill formal containment is therefore merely epistemic rather than ontological. I argue that Newton takes eminent containment to be, both for himself and for Descartes, real.

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12. Rajiva, Suma

Abstract for the Atlantic Canada Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy, 2009

“Forbidden Knowledge and Practical Needs: Kant’s Modest Proposal for Reflecting on God”

The centrality of God to early modern European philosophy undergoes a shift from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century, culminating in Kant’s rejection of a theoretical basis or role for God while incorporating God into our practical and aesthetic lives. Kant removes God from the concerns of theoretical rationality but reintroduces the divine into moral rationality and such areas of judgment as aesthetics and teleology. In so doing he not only allows but demands a fairly robust theistic conception of God, though restricted to symbolic rather than theoretical significance. What does such symbolism mean concretely and how does reflective judgment play a role in such symbolism?

The *Critique of Pure Reason* becomes the site for a simultaneous dismissal of understanding God and acceptance of some neutral sense in which this concept, in the language of the *Prolegomena*, patrols the borders of experience through its symbolic significance. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, God takes on a more positive role, functioning in part as a symbol for meaningful order in this world and, as a postulate of pure practical reason, being the necessary judge of the eternal and infinite significance of our moral lives. This parallels the role for God in the *Groundwork* where God is famously referred to as the sovereign of the kingdom of ends.

In the *Critique of Judgment* God retains all of these characteristics but takes on a more positive though still veiled role. This veiled aspect of God, already hinted at in the *Prolegomena* and intensified in the second *Critique*, continues in dynamical sublimity’s construal of the might of nature as aesthetically signifying the might of God. This might, initially seen as physical, then turns itself back into an acknowledgement of God as the sovereign of the kingdom of ends, a point crucial to Kant’s general characterization of “true” religion as a moral religion of respect rather than one of subordination or servility.

In the second half of the *Critique of Judgment* the veil starts to lift. While the Analytic of teleological judgment reveals to us a teleological design immanent to the world, the Dialectic of teleological judgment openly moves us toward a *designer* of nature in order to have rational coherence for teleology. This designer is conceived on a theistic model and in the methodology of teleological judgment Kant makes it clear that he envisages such a designer as God.

Nonetheless, the veil remains. Kant makes it clear throughout the discussion of teleology that the designer of nature is not proof of a *God’s* existence and, in fact, the Analytic suggests strongly that teleology per se can and should function without any such designer. Moreover, the designer is only an aspect of God and perhaps, depending on how the design is conceived, not the most important aspect, as the methodology stresses. Thus in concluding the third *Critique* Kant still retains the priority of the practical so that God is still

fundamentally the sovereign of the kingdom of ends with all other attributes, such as design or power, only being attributes of this sovereign.

It is Kant's use of symbolically reflecting judgment which allows him to say a great deal in the three Critiques about a divine being without committing himself to a robust ontological conception of this being.⁹ I will then briefly examine the deconstruction of such an ontological conception of God in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the re-establishment of God in the *Groundwork*, the *Prolegomena* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* as a primarily moral and symbolic entity. I will then look more carefully at God in the discussions of sublimity and teleology in the *Critique of Judgment* and at how reflecting judgment allows a more robust conception of God than the Kantian system might seem to allow at the outset.¹⁰ I will conclude by considering just what is accomplished by first restricting talk of God in the critical philosophy¹¹ and then allowing it, through the medium of reflecting judgement. Our representation of God is made symbolic by Kant but what does such a symbol entail other than the rejection of theoretical knowledge of God? Is Kant merely trying to keep the concept of God in a subterranean and covert way? And what practical religious significance, if any, could such an abstract, symbolic, and philosophical notion of God generate?

⁹ Kant's doing this has some precedent in early modern philosophy, especially in Descartes, Locke, and Hume. All of these thinkers have varying modest conceptions of what we can say about God, Hume obviously so, Descartes and Locke less obviously.

¹⁰ In the course of paper I will touch upon the discussions of God in works other than the Critiques and their accompanying works, such as the *Groundwork* and the *Prolegomena*. Such works notably include the *Lectures on Theology*, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, and *Perpetual Peace*. However, the complexities of these other works and of their relation to the works of the critical period place an in-depth discussion of their conceptions of God outside the scope of this paper.

¹¹ Kant has quite a lot of pre-Critical discussion of God and much important discussion in work during and after the Critiques, such as his *Lectures on Philosophical Theology* and *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* as well as other work, such as *Toward Perpetual Peace*. However, for the purposes of this discussion I will mention relevant material from these works but will not specifically focus on them, though they are important for a more systematic consideration of his philosophical theology.

13. Raynor, David

THE INTENTIONALITY OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS: HUME AND KANT

David Hume's "Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses", the longest section of his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), contains an explanation of the intentionality of perceptual consciousness; yet it has been entirely ignored by Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell in favour of Kant's treatment of these matters. Why? A clue may be found in Jonathan Bennett's characterization of this section of the *Treatise* as "extremely difficult, full of mistakes, and – taken as a whole – a total failure; yet its depth and scope and disciplined complexity make it one of the most instructive arguments in modern philosophy." [*Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes*, page 313.]

But this cannot be the whole story as to why Kant has so overshadowed Hume in this area. Simon Blackburn has claimed "that, with the possible exception of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is the deepest and most insightful treatment of perception in the modern period, at least until the later years of the twentieth century." [*How to Read Hume* (Granta, 2008), page 34.] To understand why Sellars completely avoided this part of the *Treatise* we need to consider how it was regarded by his teachers at Oxford – H.A. Prichard and H.H. Price – but even to go farther back to Marvin Faber of Buffalo and his teacher Edmund Husserl. But the aim of this exercise is not simply to understand a blindspot in Sellars's understanding of modern philosophy. The second part of the paper will involve a close study of the neo-Kantian account of intentionality and perception found in John McDowell's recent book, *Having the World in View* (Harvard University Press, 2009), and especially its first part entitled "Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality", which is a kind of dialogue with Sellars and Kant. My hope is that attention to Hume's relatively neglected account of the intentionality of perceptual consciousness will contribute in insightful ways to this interesting debate between McDowell and Sellars.

14. Stencil, Eric

Arnauld's Actualism: Abstract

Antoine Arnauld was considered by his peers as having one of the great philosophical minds of his time (the 17th century). Modern scholars (at least those acquainted with Arnauld's philosophy) have tended to agree, and yet his philosophy has not received the attention it deserves. One area in which careful study of Arnauld's philosophy is most deserved is his treatment of modal metaphysics, specifically his account of the philosophical ground of possibility. Arnauld does not offer a systematic treatment of modality anywhere in his forty-three volume corpus. Nevertheless, there is a remarkable consistency throughout his writings concerning modal issues. Alan Nelson has argued that in the Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence Arnauld "espoused a strongly actualist doctrine."¹² Emanuela Scribano also notes Arnauld's discussion in the correspondence and explains "according to Arnauld, it is not the lack of contradiction of a proposition, that is, it is not in itself and by its own nature that a thing is possible, but a thing is possible in relation to its cause, that is, the all powerful divine."¹³

In this paper, I will draw on the work of Nelson and Scribano and offer an interpretation of Arnauld in which I argue not only that Arnauld held an actualist theory of possibility, but that he developed a sophisticated *de re modal actualism*. Actualism is the position that everything that is real, is actual. That is, actualism denies that there are any non-actual individuals and claims that all philosophically interesting uses of possibility are analyzable into facts about actually existing things.¹⁴ This view can be contrasted with possibilism. Possibilism claims that actual things are only a subset of the things which are real as there are also possible, non-actual things.¹⁵ One type of actualism is modal actualism. Modal actualists are actualists who take "modal notions to be essential to an adequate characterization of the actual world."¹⁶ Modal actualists deny that the actual world can be fully characterized in non-modal terms. Among the modal actualists, one can make a further distinction between *de re modal actualism* and *de dicto modal actualism*. *De re modal actualists* take the irreducibly modal features of the actual world to be entities, while *de dicto modal actualists* take the irreducibly modal features of the world to be propositions.

¹² Alan Nelson, (1993) "Cartesian Actualism in the Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 23, pp. 675-94

¹³ "Suivant Arnauld, ce n'est pas la non contradiction d'une proposition, c'est-a-dire, ce n'est pas en soi et par sa propre nature qu'une chose est possible, mais une chose est possible par rapport a sa cause, c'est-a-dire a la toute puissance divine," Emanuela Scribano, "Le 'Spinozisme' D'Arnauld", in Wiep van Bunge and Wim Klever, eds. *Disguised and Overt Spinozism around 1700*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996) pp. 291-304, at p. 300.

¹⁴ Menzel, Christopher, "Actualism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/actualism/>; and Nelson p. 676.

¹⁵ Menzel (2008).

¹⁶ Loux, Michael, *The Possible and the Actual* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 49 and p. 54.

In order to argue that Arnauld held a *de re* modal actualism, I will begin by discussing Arnauld's basic ontology, specifically as presented in *The Logic or the Art of Thinking* which serves as a bedrock for his actualism. Arnauld's basic ontology is largely Cartesian, but he strays from Descartes' account in several important ways which has not garnered much attention. In addition to helping support my interpretation of Arnauld's actualism, this discussion will contribute to a better understanding of the nature of Arnauld's Cartesianism.

Having set out Arnauld's basic ontological commitments, I apply this discussion to the Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence and argue that in the correspondence Arnauld endorses a *de re modal actualism*. I argue that the primary machinery Arnauld uses to provide an analysis of possibility is the actually existing essences of substances. These actually existing essences are irreducibly modal things. It is within the power of minds, or any particular mind, for example, to have an infinite number of modifications. That is, it is true of the actually existing individual substance that there are an infinite number of different modes that it could have.

The interpretation I offer will help explain some claims Arnauld makes in the correspondence, which might seem odd on the surface. For example, his claim that he has no conception of purely possible substances, his denial of a "possible Adam" and his insistence that possible Adams are merely "the same Adam considered now as possible and now as created."¹⁷ Finally, I discuss a recent debate about whether Arnauld would accept transworld identity. Transworld identity is the claim that some individuals can exist in more than one possible world. I will argue that the answer to this question depends on how strict of an interpretation of 'transworld' is being used.

¹⁷ *The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence*, trans. H. T. Mason, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967, p. 28 and p. 31.

15. Tinguely, Eric

What is Orientation Not in Thinking?

A Reconsideration of Kant and the Role of Feelings in Knowledge

My presentation aims to raise a question Kant almost—but doesn't quite—ask: what is orientation? At stake in this question is one of the most central and problematic features of modern philosophy, namely the relationship between cognition and affection, broadly speaking. In an essay from 1786 Kant proposes to answer the question “What is Orientation *In Thinking?*” by building from an analogy of how we orient ourselves *in the world* via a joint operation of (i) a subjective *feeling* of the difference between ‘left’ and ‘right’ and (ii) a given object whose spatial orientation is *already known*. This double-sided account of worldly orientation—which is intended set up by analogy a notion of orientation in thinking (where “objective principles...are insufficient”)—raises interesting questions of its own. And yet these are questions which Kant not only ignores, but questions perhaps that he needs to ignore, since they call into question not only central features of his critical program (e.g. “Reason does not feel”) but also crucial assumptions of modern philosophy in general. Among the handful of scholars who pay attention to the Orientation essay, almost without exception the question that is pressed is what to make of the mysterious ‘subjective grounds of discrimination’ (*subjectiven Unterscheidungsgrund*)—the subjective or affective pole of the operation of orientation, the pole Kant himself stresses in the essay as the one relevant to orienting ourselves *in thought*. Orientation, in that case, seems to be a kind of proto-aesthetic-reflective-judgment, and thus read in this way the Orientation essay becomes an Ur-form of the Analytic of Beauty in the *Critique of Judgment*. Thus the notion of “orientation” has recently begun to work its way into the philosophical currency as a conceptual resource for uncovering and articulating the “wider significance” of Kant's aesthetics—in particular, trying to show how *taste* and *reflective judgment* as introduced in the third critique bear upon the epistemological and the moral projects laid out in the prior two critiques. But by following Kant's own lead, what these accounts leave out is the other, cognitive, pole of orientation: the orienting object that is to be already known. In one sentence, my presentation wants to ask what it means to “know” an orienting object.

The question that remains overlooked, in short, is: what is it that must be known about an object in order that it can serve as a touchstone against which our subjective discriminating feelings orient us? Following Hume's treatment of taste, an orienting object, according to Kant, is one of which we *first* have a *prior* cognitive recognition which is somehow subsequently deemed appropriate to hang our subjective feelings upon. And the problem, quite simply, is that this cognitive cum affective judgment does not make sense. By what possible criteria could I ever recognize an object as an appropriate candidate for an aesthetic judgment if the feelings are not already involved in the very recognition of that object? What attention to this cognitive pole of orientation suggests, then, is that there is some class of objects—call them “orienting objects”—the knowledge or

recognition of which cannot be had apart from a discriminating affect. An orienting object is one that can only be known in feeling: it must be “feelingly apprehended”. The problem is that there doesn’t appear to be room within the framework of modern epistemology for cognitive claims that involve an ineliminable affective moment. So the simple question that calls for consideration is whether there is or is not in fact such a thing as “orientation”.

The suggestion that cognition cannot be wholly separated from affection has cropped at various philosophical sites throughout the twentieth century: for example, Heidegger’s “moods”; Martha Nussbaum’s “love’s knowledge”; Adorno’s use of *cathexis*; McDowell and Wiggins’s “Sensible Subjectivism”. And all of these accounts take themselves to be arguing *against* the position of early modern philosophy. I propose to focus the terms of this debate by examining through the issue of “orientation” one particular philosophical crossroads in which the strain between affection and cognition is particularly acute. At issue is not only one particular chapter in the history of modern philosophy, but the way this heritage continues to shape the questions pressing for our own contemporary times.